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In the Supreme Court
of ihe State of Utah
"\YILLL.\:Jl G. CARYER, doing business as CARYER SHEET :METAL
"\YORKS,
Plailntiff and Appellant,
CAsE No.

vs.

7374

"\Y. T. DENN, doing business as HUBBARD DENN JEWELERS,
Defen-dant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This statement of facts will be much the same as
that set forth by appellant in his brief. However, there
are certain variations so a re"'statement of the facts
will probably meet the conditions herein presented.
Sometime prior to June 7, 1947, one Fred Dunn,
an employee of the respondent, suggested to George
Maycock that Mr. W. T. Denn, of the firm of HubbardDenn, was interested in a cooling system. It appeared
that Dunn had known that Maycock was in the business
of installing coolers of one kind and another and asked
Maycock if he would consult 1\t[r. Denn about it.
1
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Thereafter Maycock came into Denn 's place of business and the two of the1n did discuss the need of a cooling system for the Hubbard-Denn Jewelers at 221 Main
Ntreet in Salt Lake City, on at least two or three occasions. Denn was entirely without any information or
learninr; about the cooling business, nor did he know
anything about how air conditioners worked and so informed Mr. Maycock. Maycock had represented himself
as an engineer with particular reference to the air conditioning business.
The proposed cooling system was discussed at least
on one other occasion, but at no time was any mention
made of any type of cooler, Denn placing himself and
his needs entirely in the hands of Maycock. It was finally
determined that an air conditioner should be installed
but at no time during the conversations with Mr. Maycock was there any mention made of any type of air conditioner nor does any of the evidence even suggest such
a thing.
It was finally determined that the store should be
air conditioned and thereafter Mr. George Maycock
brought one Jack Goaslind into the Hubbard-Denn store
and told Mr. Denn that the Carver Sheet Metal Works
would do the installing of the equipment. Goaslind made
certain measurements about the place and proceeded
to install what now appears to have been a Palmer
Evaporative Air Conditioner. Denn didn't know Goaslind and apparently had never seen him before Maycock
brought him in. Denn believed that Goaslind was doing
the installing for Maycock until a certain letter dated
June 7, 1947, was delivered to him wherein William G.
2
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CarYN'. doing- business as the CarYer Sheet _Metal \York~,
ag-reed to furnish and install a 1500-H Palmer Evapora-

tiYe :\ir Conditioner with all neressary fittings and grill
for the sum of $870.00, which included electrical and
necessary plumbing work.
The faet that it was a Palmer or any other type of
machine meant nothing to l\Ir. Denn because he had
absolutely no information about such machines and he
had placed his entire reliance upon Maycock.
The machine was supposed to make no more noise
than an electric fan, but after it was installed, the noise
was so great that they were obliged to turn it off. Later
Goaslind came back and insisted that they could make
the machine operate satisfactorily, but after several
attempts the machine does not operate satisfactorily,
it does not cool the .store; it is noisy, carries dust into
the store, which hampers the watchmakers in their work,
and in all respects is an unsatisfactory operation.
It develops that after Maycock had succeeded In
selling Denn a cooling system, the name of which was
never mentioned, he then supplied the equipment to the
appellant herein, and from that time on it was the appellant who did all the work and now seeks to be paid for
the equipment and its installation. Maycock disappeared
from the transaction and admits under oath, as appellant's witness, that there is no obligation financially or
otherwise to him from respondent in this action.

It appears from the record affirmatively and without dispute that neither Denn nor Dunn, his employe,e,
had ever heard of the Palmer Evaporative Air Condi3
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tioner, and that the name thereof meant absolutely
nothing to them, and it likewise appears from the testiInony of George Maycock that the only thing that ever
was talked about was ju.st the function of the machine.
With respect to the cooling service which the
machine rendered, Mr. Dunn testifies that he placed a
thermometer which was so used all summer in the front
of the store and they got 98°, and the thermometer
showed that at the same time it was 94° in the office;
that in the front portion of the store, the cooler made
no material difference in the heat; that when the machine
was working it made a tremendous humming noise so
that cu.stomers and clerks alike were obliged to raise
their voices in order to be heard; that the machine disturbed customers when it was running and in order to
do business in the store, the machine had to be shut off;
that in the place where the watchmakers worked, when
the machine was running, a film of dust was drawn in
from the outside and laid on the watchmakers' benches
so that good watchmaking could not be done; and that in
addition to that when the machine was working, the
watchmaking room wa.s so hot that it was very uncomfortable for the people working there. This evidence is
entirely undisputed.
Another objectionable feature was the odor, which
was described by the witness Dunn as like old wet gunny
sacks, was noticeable always when the machine operated.
However, in spite of all this both Mr. Dunn and Mr.
Denn stated that if a machine could be made to work,
they wanted a cooler in the store but they wanted one
4
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that would giYe then1 n1ore cooling in the store than 98°
front and ~14° in the back end.

ARGUMENT
..:\..ppellant has stated that the only question to be
deter1nined in this appeal is the proper application of
Section 81-1-15 Utah Code Annotated 1943, and particularly subdivisions ( 1) and ( 4) of this Section, to the
facts. which subdivision3 read as follows :
(1) "\Vhere the buyer expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular
purpose for which the goods are required, and
it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment (whether he is the grower or
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for
ouch purpose.

( 4) In the case of a contract to sell or a
sale of a specified article under its patent or other
trade name, there is no implied warranty as to
its fitness for any particular purpose.
and he asks the question, "Can an installer who is
neither the dealer nor the manufacturer of an article
which is described by its patent or trade name be charged
with an implied warranty of quality, particularly where
there io a complete absence of any evidence of reliance
by the buyer upon the installer~''
Respondent might have some little agreement with
the first part of the above declaration, but believes that
the evidence which has been introduced in this case
thoroughly justifies the implied warranty of quality
which the trial court found was there.
5
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Referring to one of plaintiff's witnesses, George
:Maycock, appellant states that this witness testified that
he was asked by Fred Dunn to come to defendant's place
of business to discuss the installation of a cooling device;
that he did so and after several meetings with the defendant, W. T. Denn, and with Fred Dunn, they decided
upon the installation of a Palmer Evaporative Air Conditioner. Counsel has drawn largely on his imagination
for this idea because the record will be searched in vain
for any such evidence. Nowhere in the testimony of Mr.
~f a~Tcock nor in the testimony of any other witness is
there any statement that Dunn or anybody ·else ever
decided upon the installation of a Palmer Air Conditioner. As a matter of fact, the first time that respondent
or anybody in their employ appear to have ever had
the slightest information that a Palmer Evaporative Air
Conditioner was the type to be installed is found in the
letter, defendant's Exhibit 1, which was delivered to
Mr. Denn by Carver himself after Goaslind had been
taken to Denn's place of business by Maycock (Tr. 103),
and it is singularly significant that in no place in the
testimony introduced is there any recommendation about
the quality of the Palmer Air Conditioner, and if we
may draw a conclusion from the testimony of Mr. Maycock as found on page 38 of the reporter's transcript, or
page 68 of the record, it will be noticed that Maycock
seemed not now to represent the Palmer company, which
would indicate that even the Maycock people are not
sold upon that type of cooler.
An analysis of the circumstances which lead up to
this litigation may be helpful here. The respondent was
6
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desirous of installing a cooler of some type and it must
be adinitted that the eYidenee preponderantly bears out
the fact that ~Lr. Denn nor none of hi:-; associates knew
anything about cooling sy.sten1s. .An expert in the line
and one who had had dealings with this type of service
was contactel1. He made several visits to respondent at
his place of business and finally it was decided that a
cooler would be installed. There is absolutely no evidence, as we have indicated above, as to the type of
cooler at that time, nor L~ there a single word of testimony which would indicate that the name Palmer Evaporative Air Conditioner was ever used.
It appears that the negotiations covered between
two and four weeks (Tr. 70). Maycock indicated to
Denn that a fair degree of cooling could be secured from
the cooling system and that there would not be a great
deal of noise in its operation (Tr. 72). It was decided
as undesirable to place the mechanism outside the building in the alley. There is a dispute in the testimony as
to whether the installation was to be made by a contractor or if Denn would do the installing himself, or
that the Carver Sheet Metal Works should make the installation. Maycock took Jack Goaslind of the Carver
Sheet Metal Works to talk with Denn with relation to
the installation and he, Maycock, declares that beyond
that he knows nothing about the installation itself. He
does admit, however, that he showed Goaslind where
the installation was to be and he had seen the installation after it was complete. He admits that there was
too much noise and there was an accumulation of condensation on the ceiling which caused water to drop;
7
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that a new Inotor was installed and that other changes
were n1ade in the installation, and finally a peripheral
lining was placed around the cabinet work.
:Maycock had been in the evaporative air conditioner
jnstallation business for twelve years. He testified that
as to dust or dirt on the affluent, the outside air side, it
should be practically eliminated; but on the inside you
can't do a thing about it. There is nothing that can be
provided to eliminate the amount of dust or odor or
anything of that sort which might be in the air as it
comes into the conditioning unit.
Maycock was the engineer who was in charge of thisinstallation and admitted that there was noise when the
machine was running. Maycock admitted that the store
was very warm and that he had seen the thermometer
and as he re1nembered it was 84°. He admitted that it
1night have been higher; testified that it didn't make
any difference to Denn what the machine was, whether
it was a Smith or Palmer, or any other machine; that
he didn't elaborate on the quality of the machine, just
its function. It was Maycock who wrote the letter for
the Carver people, defendant's Exhibit 1 (Tr. 109).
Denn testified that he didn't know Goaslind until
Maycock brought him in and was of the opinion that
Goaslind was doing the installing for Maycock. In fact,
he knew no different until the letter of June 7, 1947 was
delivered to him. Denn, of course, knew absolutely nothing about where such a machine should be installed, nor
how, nor any of the details, and had to rely, aa indeed
he did, entirely upon the people furnishing and installing
8
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the 1nachine. There was a bit of smooth maneuvering
on the part of :Jir. :JLayroek. He attempts to avoid re~ponsibility and, so far as ~Ir. Denn is concerned, succeeded because he sold the equipment to the Carver people who agreed to furnish and install it, Exhibit l, and
:JI.ayrork declares that respondent owes him nothing.
\Yh~~, "~e wonder, did :\raycock dodge this issue!
The plaintiff knew that they were installing a cooling ~~~stein in a jewelry store. He knew it was required
to cool the store. He lmew too that the Inachine should
not di::;turb customers. He knew that if it threw water
all over the ceiling and made it appear to be raining in
the building, that the machine wasn't working properly.
He knew that in a jewelry store watches are repaired;
that dirt on a watchmaker's bench would be just about
as appropriate as kerosene on a baker's molding board.
He knew too that neither Denn nor anybody in the jewelry store knew anything about cooling systems. At
least this latter is a reasonable presumption from the
testimony "which has been introduced.
Now, what did the machine do~ Beginning at the
end of the room in which it was installed, we find that
it threw dust in on the work benches of the watchmakers
to such an extent that it had to he shut off. Also, that
very room which up to the time the cooler was installed
was reasonably comfortable in the summer time, when
the machine was running the room was unbearably hot
(Tr. 65). The machine when first installed threw off
so much water that the water actually dripped from the
ceiling. That, however, was corrected to a certain extent.
The noise of the machine when it was operating after
9
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the last correction.s were made is so great that people
working in the store in dealing with customers have to
raise their voices to a place where it is uncomfortable
for everybody. The machine is distracting to customers
and makes the doing of business hard, to say the least.
The machine does not cool the store, particularly the
front or we.st end where the customers come in. A thermmneter was installed and was kept there throughout
the entire summer. In the afternoons the temperature
in the store went up to 98° in the front and back in the
office it was cooled down to 94°, all of which can be seen
as unbearably hot. A cooling machine that did not cool
the front of the store below 98° would be absolutely useless to the respondent.
Appellant made various efforts to adjust the difficulties but there never wa.s a time when the machine
would work so that the customers were not disturbed;
when dust was not brought into the watchmakers'
benches ; when the front end of the store was not exceedingly hot; when the watchmakers' room was not so hot
that the men could hardly work in it, and all in all the
machine was an ab.solute failure and after repeated
efforts on the part of the people who installed it, no
change was brought about in the conditions, and thereupon a recision of the contract was declared and Carver
notified to take out the machine. It seems that no other
conclusion can be reached than that this machine failed
to do and perform the offices for which it was purchased.
The section of the statute above set forth provides
'that there is no implied warranty of quality or fitne.ss for
any particular purpose under a contract to sell except

10
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where the buyer absolutely or by implication makes
know~n to the seller the particular purpose for which the
good::; were required and the buyer looks to the seller's
skill to ::;upply that need. Certainly in this rase the buyer
indicated clearly what his need was and it is admitted
that the buyer h.11ew nothing about that type of equipment. Granting that appellant was not in on all the preliminary ronver.sations, the fact remains that he was in
the business of furnishing and installing such equipment. He kne"- it was a cooler and he knew what a cooler
was supposed to do, and while there is no privity of
contract at all between Denn and Maycock, there certainly may be such a responsibility between Carver and
:Maycock that Carver can be relieved of any damage
he may sustain as the result of the failure of this equipment in defendant' .s store, but the respondent has nothing to do nor is he concerned with this.
Appellant has cited the case of Landes and Company v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 10 Pacific (2d) 389. This
case dealt with the purchase price of a harvester for
which the suit was brought. The defendant pleaded a
breach of implied warranty but the court found against
the defendant upon the theory that the contract provided against such a warranty.
Battle Creek Bread Wrapping Machine Company v.
Paramount Baking Company, 88 Utah 67, 39 Pacific (2d)
323, is also cited. In this case the court found:
''The fact that an article ha.s a trade name
does not negative an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose where it is purchased
not by name but for a particular purpose and supplied for that purpose."
11
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In the case at bar a cooling system was ordered for
a particular purpose and it was installed and it did not
deliver the service for which it was sold, and the courto
have held that the buyer of a machine may under the
co1nmon law or the uniform sales act rely upon an implied warranty of fitness for the purpose indicated where
he made known to the manufacturer and the seller the
purpose for which the machine was desired, and trusts
to the latter's skill and judgment to furnish a machine
suitable for the purpose.
Dunn Road Machine Company v. Charlevoix A. &
Engineering Company, 247 Michigan 398, 225 Northwestern 592, 64 ALR 947. J. L. Owens Company v.
Leland Farmer Elevator Company, 192 Iowa 771, 185
Northwestern 590.
Universal Motor Company v. Snow, 149 Virginia
690, 140 Southeastern 653, 59 ALR 1174.
In this case the motor company through its salesman sold to the defendant a mill to be substituted for a
burrmill then in use by the defendant. The mill was
installed and the defendant made a cash payment and
gave two notes for the balance. The first note was paid
but when the defendant refused to pay the second note,
an action was brought to enforce its payment and the
defendant by answer claimed a breach of warranty
attending the sale because he said the mill wouldn't do
what it was supposed to do. In 'this case a small model
mill was exhibited to the defendant. In the case at bar
no such proof ·exists. However, the mill would not do
what it was represented it would do, and the court found
12
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that there was an in1plied warranty in favor of the defendant and found again8t the plaintiff and this finding
was affir1ned by the court of last resort. In the course
of that opinion the court approved the doctrine in Linen
Thread Cmnpany v. Shaw, 9th Fed. (2d) 17, wherein the
court said:
''Regardless of the statutes of l\lassachu.sett8, there is under the common law an in1plied
warranty that articles supplied by a manufacturer
or a dealer shall be reasonably fit for the purpose
for which he knew they were intended provided
the purchaser relies on his skill and knowledge.''
In Jones v. Just, 23 English Ruling Cases 466, the
rules of implied warranty are classified and approved
and under ~mbdivision 4 of such classification is the
following:
"Where a manufacturer or dealer contracts
to sell an article which he manufactures or produces, or in which he deals, to be applied to a
particular purpose so that the buyer necessarily
trusts to the judgment or skill of the Inanufacturer or dealer, there is in that case an in1plied
term of warranty that the article will be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it was to be
applied.''
In Bristol Tramways and Carriage Company v.
Fiat Motors, K.B. 831, it is held:
''Where the 1Juyer of certain omnibuses informed the seller they were required for a certain
character of traffic, this statement was held sufficient to show that the buyer relied upon the seller's skill or judgment without any further evidence on the point, and that, being so, there was

13
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an implied condition that the omnibuses would be
reasonably fit for the declar·ed purpose.''
See al.:;o Ireland v. Lewis K. Liggett Company, 243
Massachusetts 243, 137 Northeastern 371.
Counsel cites Iron Fireman Coal Stoker Company
v. Brown, 182 Minnesota 399, 234 Northwestern 685 and
quotes at length from the opinion. He stops his quoting
where the language does him the most good; however,
he should have continued because the opinion goes on
after citing cases to say:
''Such cases as Aetna Chemical Company v.
Spaulding and Kimball Company, '98 Vermont
51, 126 Atlantic 582; Remsberg v. Hackney Manufacturing Company, 174 California 799, 164 Pacific 792; and Empire Cream Separator Company
v. Quinn, 184 Appellant Division 302, 171 New
York Supplement 413, seem to be grounded on the
thought ·that the purchaser knew what he was
ordering and is inferentially credited with having
made the selection : ' '
The court then goes on to say:
''This provision of the statute is merely a
restatement of the common law rule where it ia
a sale of the known, described and defined article,
and if that article is in fact supplied there is no
implied warranty but· we think the rule at common law and now under such a statute means
articles known in the market and among those
familiar with that kind of trade by description.''
Citing cases, and then :
"In this case it would seem that the Iron
Fir.eman .wasn't known to defendants. They were
entirely Ignorant aa to its ability or capacity to

14
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work or the work which it would do. Plaintiff
was in possession of all these facts. Defendants
did not even know it had a tnHle nan1e. It then
had a lin1ited use in their community * * * They
had no knowledge of the Iron ~--,ireman by reputation or otherwise. They made their desires
known to plaintiff * * * Defendants unsuccessfully atten1pted to n1ake it work. Plaintiff knew
defendants had no knowledge of the equipment
or its operation. Defendants' reliance on plaintiff'~ judgment as to the suitability of the equipment to meet their requirements is evident from
all the circumstances * * * The fact that the
article had a trade name does not do away with
the implied warranty arising out of the circumstances indicated.'' Citing cases.
In this case it is also found that where a buyer
ignorant of his own requirements informs the seller of
his particular need.::; and the seller undertakes to select
and supply an article suitable for the purpos·e involved,
subdivision (1) and not subdivision (4), G. S. 1923 (Section 8390) applies even though the article may be described in the contract of sale by its trade name.
In Bagley v. International Harvester Company, 206
Pacific Reporter ( 2d) 43, the court says:
"The major question in determining the existence of an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpo.::;e is the reliance by the buyer
upon the skill and judgment of the seller to select
an article suitable for his needs and the question
as to whether the article was described by its
trade name or trademark is not conclusive if the
other conditions exist which would raise an rmplied warranty of its character."

15
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Pierce v. Crowl, 190 Pacific (2d) 1003. This was
an action brought by plaintiff againat the defendants
for recovery of damage because defendants used a defective material which caused the hous·e of plaintiff to
give off moisture both on the inside and outside and
plaintiff was damaged by the sweating of his house.
There was a defense interposed but the court held:
''Where an article of personal property is
sold for a definite purpose made known to the
·aeller and the seller repr·esents that the article
will perform that particular purpose, there is a
warranty of fitness which protects the purchaser
and for which the seller is liable in the event the
article fails to do what it was sold to do." Citing
cases.
In Greenland Development Company v. Allied Heating Products Company, 184 Virginia 588, 35 Southeastern (2d) 801, 164 ALR 1312, the court reiterates the
doctrine that when one contracts to supply an article in
which he deals to he applied to a particular purpose so
that the buyer necesaarily trusts to the judgment or skill
of the vendor, there is an implied warranty that it shall
be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be
applied, and the better doctrine is that the rule applies
to dealers as well as manufacturers, and this court also
declares that where the purchaaer does not designate any
specific article but orders a particular quality for a
particular purpose and the seller knows of this purpose,
the presumption is that the purchaser relies upon the
judgment of the seller and the seller by undertaking to
furnish the goods impliedly undertakes that they shall
be reasonably fit for the purpoae for which they are
intended.
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~-\.ppellant 1uakes 11mch, or attenlph; to make much,
of the fact that this cooling system was described by its
patent or tradp name and cites several cases in support
of the fact that there can be no implied warranty that an
article "-ould suit the particular needs of the buyer where
it is ~elected by its trade name or trademark even though
the buyer had communicated to the seller his particular
use for or the need for the article, or the seller had
other"-ise obtained information in this regard. It is submitted that so far as the case at bar is concerned, these
case:-; have no application and they are clearly distinguishable because in the case at bar the respondent had
absolutely nothing to do with the selection of the article
and the fact that it had a name meant simply nothing to
respondent. He didn't see the article before it was installed; he knew nothing about the distinction or the
good and bad qualities of competing equipment. As a
matter of fact, he had never heard of the Palmer Evaporative Air Conditioner before he saw the name written
in the offer of appellant to install it, and he was absolutely without any knowledge as to what it would do or
how it would do it, and he relied entirely upon the people
selling him the equipment and installing it that it would
produce the desired effect.

Not only that, but there is no evidence of any kind
that the name of the cooler installed is a trade name
or that there are patents affecting it. Nor is there the
slightest indication of any kind which would even impute
knowledge about the machine or its possible workings to
respondent. Appellant knew all about it and the undis-
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puted evidence here indicates preponderantly that re~pondent relied on appellant fully.
The fact that appellant determined to take over
where ~\Iaycock left off is not the responsibility of the
respondent, and the fact that appellant was willing to
take a chance on the equipment which he did install is
likewise not any responsibility of the Hubbard-Denn
.Jewelers. But appellant took on the responsibility of
installing a cooler in the store of Hubbard-Denn Jewelers which would cool the place and which would not be
noisy nor dusty nor discommode customers and for a
certain price. The machine failed to do all the things for
which it was wanted and for which respondent relied
upon appellant.
It is, therefore, insisted that there was an implied
warranty of fitness that it would do all the things which
respondent requir,ed to be done, and having failed to do
so, as is shown by a preponderance of the evidence in
this case, the judgment of the trial court was right and
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

DAN B. SHIELDS,
Attorney for Res,pondent
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